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CAPITAL GAINS AND THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper shows that, in the presence of differential taxation of 
ordinary income and capital gains, use of the Officer (1994) version 
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model can result in significant mis-
estimation of the cost of equity capital.  In particular, with a high 
dividend yield, the cost of equity may be underestimated by four 
percentage points.  Underestimation is of particular significance in 
the context of setting output prices for regulated utility firms. 
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CAPITAL GAINS AND THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL  
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The Officer (1994) approach to estimation of the expected cost of equity capital under a 
system of dividend tax imputation,1 has been widely accepted in Australia among both 
the academic and practitioner communities in finance.2 
 
Officer views the tax effect of imputation as a company tax phenomenon and measured 
rates of return thus incorporate the effect of tax credits.3  He states the CAPM as :
 
 [ ] jFmFj RRERRE b-+= )ˆ()ˆ(   
where 
 RF = risk free rate for the period 
 jRˆ  = rate of return on the equity of company j, including imputation credits 
 mRˆ  = rate of return on the market portfolio, including imputation credits 
 jb  = 
( )
( )m
mj
RVar
RRCov
ˆ
ˆ,ˆ
 
 
                                         
1 A dividend imputation tax system was adopted in the UK in 1973, in Australia in 1987, and New Zealand 
followed in 1988.  The basic system now exists in a wide range of countries; Smith (1993) provides a 
comprehensive review of the range of models across countries.
 
2 Examples of textbooks that have adopted the Officer approach are Bishop et. al. (1993, Ch. 16) and 
Peirson et al (1998, Ch. 15).  The reports of the utility regulatory authorities in Victoria and New South 
Wales show general acceptance of the Officer approach for utility rate setting not only by the authorities 
but also by the entities affected and by their financial advisors.  Anecdotal evidence the authors are aware 
of and their own casual observation both support there being a similar degree of acceptance of the approach 
for applications in the private sector.
 
3 Officer’s view of imputation tax stands in contrast to the view of imputation tax being an investor tax 
phenomenon.  Under the latter view, imputation is seen as providing a reduced tax rate for investors on 
income from dividends.  The views differ only by “a transform” and therefore the difference is not 
substantive.  The investor tax view of imputation tax is the view that has been taken almost uniformly in 
the literature on the CAPM and imputation tax systems.  The literature effectively starts with Brennan 
(1970) and includes Stapleton and Burke (1977), Ashton (1989, 1991), Cliffe and Marsden (1992), Lally 
(1992), Okunev and Tahir (1992), Monkhouse (1993), van Zijl (1993), Brailsford and Davis (1995), 
Dempsey (1996), and Brailsford and Heaney (1998).   The general body of this literature is reviewed in 
Lally (2000). 
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The apparently simple form of Officer’s CAPM is due to the implicit assumption that 
the tax rates on capital gains and ordinary income are equal (or, more generally, that th  
weighted average of the tax ratio [ ] in equation (5) below is zero).  In Australia, the 
effective capital gains tax rate has been and will remain less than the tax rate on ordinary 
income because (i) in the past capital gains tax has applied only to the real e ement of a 
gain, and in future individuals and superannuation funds will pay the tax on only 50% 
and 67% respectively of a gain, and (ii) the tax is payable only on realisation of a gain 
and can therefore be deferred.  The assumption of equality of the rates on capital gains 
and ordinary income is thus a significant abstraction from the reality of the Australian 
tax system and use of the Officer CAPM for estimation of the cost of capital therefore 
inevitably involves a degree of approximation.4  
 
Given the recent review of the Australian tax system, this paper examines the magnitude 
of the approximation likely to result from continued use of the Officer approach under 
the new structure.  In Section 2 we derive a form of the CAPM that also treats 
imputation as a company tax phenomenon but which does not assume equality of the tax 
rates on capital gains and ordinary income.  Comparison of that model with Officer’s 
form of the CAPM thus provides an analytical expression for the approximation made in 
applications using Officer’s CAPM.  In Section 3 we explore the magnitude of the 
approximation under a variety of assumptions about the values of the relevant 
parameters determining the cost of capital.  Our conclusion is that the degree of 
approximation is in most cases small but, in the case of high dividend yield companies, 
underestimation of around four percentage points could result.  Approximations of this 
                                         
4 The authors' experience of cost of capital estimation is that practitioners in New Zealand have not 
followed the Officer approach.  Instead, imputation is viewed as an investor tax phenomenon and measured 
rates of return therefore do not reflect tax credits.  The form of the CAPM most commonly used has been :   
jmTFRmREmTFRjRE b)]1()([)1()( --+-=  
where Rx is the return on x excluding tax credits, and Tm is the statutory maximum personal tax rate which 
until recently was equal to the corporate tax rate, 0.33.  The model is often referred to as the “after tax” 
form of the CAPM.  It assumes that the tax on capital gains is zero across all investors, and that there is full 
attachment of imputation credits.  There is evidence that, in recent times, some practitioners have switched 
to versions of the CAPM which give recognition to the fact that the cpital gains tax, while low on average, 
is not zero.  Examples of such models are Lally (1992) and van Zijl (1993).  It is not apparent why practice 
in New Zealand has developed differently from that in Australia.  The two countries have extensive 
commercial links and the switch from the classical to the imputation tax systems occurred at about the same 
time.  The assumption of a zero capital gains tax underlying the New Zealand approach is unrealistic but 
probably less so than the assumption made in Australia of equality of the tax rates across capital gains and 
ordinary income.  On the other hand, the New Zealand approach of assuming full attachment of imputation 
credits is unrealistic, whereas the Australian approach has made allowance for this.   
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degree have potentially significant implications for project adoption and for the setting 
of output prices for regulated utilities.  Accordingly the adoption of a CAPM that 
recognises both dividend imputation and differential taxation of ordinary income and 
capital gains would seem to be justified.5 
 
2. THE CAPM WITH DIFFERENTIAL TAXATION  
 
Under the Officer approach, the rate of return on a stock comprises the capital gain, the 
cash dividend, and the imputation credits (so far as they can be used).  Thus the rate of 
return on the shares of company j, de oted by jRˆ , is
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where 
 Dj = company j's cash dividend per share over the next period 
 Pjt = price of shares in company j at time t 
  ICj = imputation credits attached to the cash dividend of company j 
 U = market wide utilisation rate for imputation credits, which ranges  
  from 0 to 1 
 
With returns defined in this way, Officer’s form of the CAPM is  
 
 jFmFj RRERRE b])ˆ([)ˆ( -+=       (1) 
 
However, as noted above, this form is based on the assumption of equal tax rates across 
capital gains and ordinary income.  The model developed in this paper does not assume 
equality of the tax rates; the derivation is set out below and follows Elton and Gruber 
(1984).   
 
                                                                                                                    
 
5 The form of the CAPM adopted could be the model derived in this paper (and thus continue with the 
company tax view) or alternatively one of the models referred to in footnote 3, based on the investor tax 
view.  
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Investor i chooses an “efficient” portfolio by combining the riskless asset with the 
“tangency” portfolio K.  Then from Roll (1977) it follows that with unrestricted short 
selling, the after tax expected return on asset j to inves or i, denoted by )ˆ( jirE , is related 
to the beta of j against portfolio K, as: 
 
                 [ ]
)ˆ(
)ˆ,ˆ(
)ˆ()ˆ(
Ki
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FiKiFiji rVar
rrCov
rrErrE -+=                                                         (2) 
 
where Kirˆ  is investor i's after tax return on portfolio K and rFi is the investor’s after-tax 
return on the riskfree asset.   
 
Defining Tgi as investor i’s tax rate on capital gains nd Tpi as the investor’s tax rate on 
ordinary income, it follows that :
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and, similarly : 
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6 In this formulation the term U(ICj)/Pj0 is equivalent to Officer’s term tj, defined as the value of the tax 
credits expressed as a proportion of the current value of the share (Officer, 1994, p. 7). 
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Then, assuming that the end of period dividend is non-stochastic, substituting these 
results into (2) and dividing by )1( giT-  gives :
7 
 
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
+
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
-
-
+-
-
=
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
-
-
-
j
j
gi
gipi
j
j
Kjgi
Ki
FiKi
gi
pi
Fj D
IC
U
T
TT
P
D
RRCovT
rVar
rrE
T
T
RRE 1
1
)ˆ,ˆ()1(
)ˆ(
)ˆ(
1
1
)ˆ(
0
 
(3) 
Defining wi as the fraction of aggregate market investments held by investor i, and li as  
 )1(
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then, multiplying (3) through by wi, dividing by li, summing across all investors, and 
noting that mKi RRw ˆˆ =å , gives : 
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Since (4) holds for all securities, it must also hold for the market, that is : 
 
                                         
7 In respect of the assumption of non-stochastic dividends, Lally (1999) shows that, if dividends are instead 
assumed to be stochastic, the only material effect is to replace dividends by their expectations in the 
resulting model. 
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Solving for å )/( iiw l , and substituting into (4), gives the CAPM with differential 
taxation : 
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that is : 
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Comparison of the CAPM derived above, with the Officer CAPM (equations (7) and (1) 
respectively), shows that the approximation made in using the Officer CAPM is given 
by Dj. 
 
From (8) it is readily seen that (in general) Dj = 0 if 
 (1) T = 0, that is, that capital gains and ordinary income are taxed equally, on 
average.  A sufficient condition is that Tgi = Tpi for all i,  
 or (2) bj = 1, dj = dm and ICj/Dj = ICm/Dm , that is, the stock matches the market in 
respect of each of beta, dividend yield, and imputation credits relative to 
dividends. 
 
As already noted earlier, capital gains and ordinary income are not tax d equally under 
the Australian tax system and therefore condition (1) does not hold.  Condition (2) must 
hold (in a loose way) “on average” and therefore the Officer CAPM will on average 
provide a very good approximation to the result of applying the CAPM with differential 
taxation.  However, for any given security, the degree of approximation could be 
significant.  
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3. DEGREE OF THE APPROXIMATION  
 
We examine the degree of approximation by substituting into the formula for Dj a 
plausible value or range of values for each of the parameters determining Dj. 
 
3.1 Parameter Values 
The relevant parameters are the riskfree rate, beta, dividend yield, the ratio of imputation 
credits to cash dividends, the utilisation rate for imputation credits, and the tax parameter
T. 
 
Consistent with recent experience, we assume that the risk free rate is 0.065.  In respect 
of beta, a plausible cross-sectional range is 0.5 to 1.5.  The market dividend yield is 
about 0.03 (data courtesy of Ord Minnett) and a plausible cross-sectional range is 0 to 
0.1.  The market ratio of imputation credits to cash dividends is 0.33 (data courtesy of 
Ord Minnett).  At the firm level this can range from 0 to a maximum of 0.56 (based on 
the current corporate tax rate of 36%).  The maximum will fall to 0.49 during the 
transition (while the corporate tax rate is 33%), and to 0.43 when the corporate tax rate 
reduces to 30%.  We therefore consider a cross-sectional range from 0 to 0.50. 
 
The utilisation rate, U, is commonly estimated at 0.6, which is consistent with the fact 
that foreign investors are significant in the market but cannot use the credits (the 
supporting studies are Brown and Clarke, 1993; Bruckner et al, 1994; Officer and 
Hathaway, 1995).  However, the CAPMs considered in this paper assume that national 
sharemarkets are fully segmented.  Consequently the utilisation rate should be 1 other 
than for the market weight of Australian investors unable to use the credits.  The only 
investors of this type are tax-exempt, and Wood (1997, footnote 10) estimates that their 
market weight is just 3-4%.  Thus 1.0 is a reasonable estimate for U.  However we also 
consider the impact of using instead the more common estimate of 0.6. 
 
The final parameter requiring estimation is T.  As shown in equation (5), this is a 
weighted average over investors of the tax ratio [ ], with weights xi.  Estimation of T thus 
requires specification of the relevant investor set, estimation of their tax rates on both 
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ordinary income and capital gains, and estimation of the weights, xi.  Th  holders of 
Australian equities can be classified as foreigners, companies, superannuation funds and 
individuals.  Since the CAPM in question, along with the Officer version, assumes that 
national capital markets are segregated, then it would be inc nsistent to recognise 
foreign investors.  Accordingly we omit them from consideration.  In respect of 
corporate holdings of shares in other companies, inclusion of them would lead to 
double-counting.  Consequently we omit them.  If companies were subj ct to taxation on 
the dividends received from other companies the personal tax rates faced by the ultimate 
recipients (individuals and superannuation funds) would need to be increased to reflect 
this.  However, companies are not taxed on dividend income, a  therefore this potential 
complication is absent.  Thus, having excluded both foreign investors and corporate 
shareholders, only individuals and superannuation funds need to be considered. 
 
Under the new tax system, the highest marginal tax on ordinary income for individuals 
will remain at 0.47 but many individuals will actually pay lower rates because of the 
progressive scale or because of income splitting.  We assume that individuals are, on 
average, subject to a 0.35 tax rate on ordinary income.  In contrast, we assume that 
superannuation funds will face the statutory tax rate of 0.15 on ordinary income. 
 
Turning to capital gains, in Australia there are two reasons for taxes on capital gains 
being lower than on ordinary income.  Firstly, only part of the assessable gain is taxable 
under the new tax system.  Individuals will be subject to tax on only 50% of assessable 
capital gains, and superannuation funds on 67% of assessable capital gains.  Under the 
old tax system, only the real gain was subject to tax.  Secondly, capital gains are taxed 
only on realisation and the resulting opportunity to defer the tax effectively reduces the 
rate of the tax.  Protopapadakis (1983) estimates that the opportunity to defer reduces the 
tax rate on capital gains by about 50%.8  These two features of the taxation regime for 
capital gains suggest that on average individual investors and superannuation funds will 
pay capital gains tax at only 25% and 33% respectively of the rates applicable to 
ordinary income.  Applied to the above estimates for tax rates on ordinary income this 
                                         
8 The opportunity to defer lowers the effective tax rate not only because of the time value of money but 
also, as Hamson and Ziegler (1990, p. 49) note, because gains can be realised when the investor’s tax rate is 
lower, such as in retirement. 
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implies effective capital gains tax rates of 0.0875 and 0.05 respectively.  That capital 
gains are taxed less onerously than ordinary income, because of exemptions and/or the 
deferral option, is well recognised, not only for Australia (see Howard and Brown, 1992) 
but other countries such as the US (see Constantinides, 1984) and the UK (see Ashton, 
1991). 
 
In respect of the weights applied to the ratio in equation (5), the weight for investor i is 
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The term [ ] reflects the risk aversion of investor i, and is unknown.  Given the absence 
of information about cross-sectional variation in risk aversion, we assume that it is 
uniform across investor tax categories.  The weight for investor i thus reduces to 
( ) ( )å -¸-= gi
i
gi
i
i T
w
T
w
x
11
 
 
For individuals and superannuation funds the market investment weights, wi, are 23% 
and 11% respectively.9  Substituting for these values and the capital gains tax rates 
estimated above yields values for xi of 0.68 for individuals and 0.32 for superannuation 
funds.  Substitution into equation (5) produces an estimate for the tax parameter T of 
0.23. 
 
The results of research on the behaviour of ex-day returns provides broad support for the 
estimate for T.10  Based on Australian data for the period 1986-1995, Hathaway and 
Officer (1995, Table 2) report an intercept of 0.70 to 0.84 in regressions of DP/D ( hare 
price change over the ex-dividend day divided by the cash dividend) on the imputation 
credits attached to the dividend.  The results are consistent with the earlier work by 
Brown and Walter (1986), covering the period 1974-1985.  The intercept in such 
                                         
9 These weights are taken from the ASX Fact Book, 1999.  We are grateful to David McCallum of ABN 
AMRO for advice on estimation of the average tax rates. 
 
10 We are grateful to John Redmayne of PricewaterhouseCoopers for suggesting this approach to estimating 
T. 
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regressions can be interpreted as being the mean value of DP/D in the absence of 
imputation credits.  In such circumstances, arbitrage suggests that  
 
( ) ( )paga TDTP -=-D 11  
 
where Tga is the average tax rate on capital gains and Tpa i the average rate on ordinary 
income.  Thus 
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The intercept values of .70 to .84 thus suggest an estimate for Ta in the range 0.16 to 
0.30.  In general T  is not equal to T, because of variation in the capital gains tax rates 
across investors.  However, in this case, there is little such variation and therefore Ta
should be close to T.  The research into ex-day returns thus indicates that T lies in the 
range of 0.16 to 0.30.  This approach to estimating Ta does ive rise to a number of 
concerns, including statistical uncertainty in the estimate of the intercept and various 
alternative explanations for intercept values differing from 1.  The latter include 
microstructure explanations (Frank and Jagannathan, 1998), evidence of anomalous 
behaviour in the broader period around the ex-day (Brown and Walter, 1986) and the 
possibility that the value reflects the actions of arbitrageurs in a particular tax bracket 
buying just before and selling just after the ex-day.  In view of these concerns, in the 
sensitivity analysis we adopt the estimate for T of 0.23 derived above but, in recognition 
of the uncertainty surrounding that estimate, we consider a range of possible values from 
0.13 to 0.33. 
 
3.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 1 below shows the values of Dj for selected combinations of the values of the 
parameters.  Adopting the estimates T = 0.23, RF = 0.065, U = 1.0, dm = 0.03, and 
ICm/Dm = 0.33, the sensitivity of Dj to variations in dj, ICj/Dj, and bj is examined by 
varying one of the latter three parameters over its relevant range and holding the other 
two at their boundary values.  Thus varying dj over the interval [0, 0.10] results in Dj 
varying as follows: 
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 over  [-0.012, 0.011]  for  ICj/Dj = 0 and bj = 0.5 
 over  [-0.006, 0.017]  for  ICj/Dj = 0 and bj = 1.5 
 over  [-0.012, 0.022]  for  ICj/Dj = 0.5 and bj = 0.5, and 
 over  [-0.005, 0.028]  for  ICj/Dj = 0.5 and bj = 1.5 
 
Similarly, varying ICj/Dj over the interval [0, 0.5] results in Dj varying as follows: 
 over  [-0.012, -0.012]  for  dj = 0 and bj = 0.5 
 over  [-0.006, -0.005]  for  dj = 0 and bj = 1.5 
 over  [0.011, 0.022]  for  dj = 0.1 and bj = 0.5, and 
 over  [0. 17, 0.028]  for  dj = 0.1 and bj = 1.5 
 
Finally, varying bj over the interval [0.5, 1.5] results in Dj varying as follows: 
 over  [-0.012, -0.006]  for  dj = 0 and ICj/Dj = 0 
 over  [-0.012, -0.005]  for  dj = 0 and ICj/Dj = 0.5 
 over  [0.011, 0.017]  for dj = 0.1 and ICj/Dj = 0, and 
 over  [0.022, 0.028]  for  dj = 0.1 and ICj/Dj = 0.5 
 
The sensitivity of Dj to variation in U is examined by repeating the above calculations 
with U = 0.6 instead of 1.0.  The results are shown in the sixth column of Table 1. 
 
Finally, we consider T.  Since T is proportional to Dj then, if T increases by 43% from 
0.23 to 0.33, the absolute value of Dj als  increases by 43%.  Similarly, if T is reduced to 
.13, the absolute value of Dj declines by 43%.  This is evident from comparis n of the 
fourth and seventh columns of Table 1. 
 
The conclusions from this sensitivity analysis are as follows.  First, across the range of 
values considered for the parameters, Dj varies dramatically: with T = .23, the variation 
is from –0.012 to 0. 28; with T = 0.33, the variation increases proportionately from        
–0.017 to 0.041.  Second, variations in each of bj, ICj/Dj and U does not, in general, 
result in a significant effect on the value of Dj (defined as more than 0.01).  Third, 
variations in dj are significant for any combination of values of the other parameters. 
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The key influences on Dj are thus dj and T.  For companies with a high dividend yield, 
use of the Officer CAPM results in underestimation of the cost of equity capital.  
Conversely, for low dividend yields, the cost of equity capital will be overestimated.  As 
T increases this effect is magnified.  The most significant underestimation result occurs 
with large values for both dj and T, where the Officer CAPM would underestimate the 
cost of equity capital by as much as 0.041. 
 
3.3 Consequences 
The consequences of the approximation identified in the preceding section are twofold.  
First, since the cost of equity is a component of the weighted average cost of capital, 
which is used to calculate the present value of the cash flows from prospective projects, 
use of the Officer CAPM could lead to the incorrect rejection and/or acceptance of some 
projects.12  Undoubtedly the adoption decision for many projects will not be sensitive to 
variations in the cost of equity to the degree shown here.  Nevertheless the decision for at 
least some projects will be affected.  For projects with very long lives, variations of even 
two percentage points to the discount rate can have a substantial effect upo  present 
value, and therefore on the adoption decision. 
 
The second consequence is for utility companies whose output prices are set on the basis 
of estimated cost of capital, such as those involved in electricity, gas or airports.  The 
recent price determination for electricity companies issued by the regulator for Victoria 
(Office of the Regulator-General, Victoria, 2000) provides a relevant example.  The 
parameter values adopted were RF = 0.062, U = 0.60, and bj was set equal to 1.00 for all 
companies.  Among the companies subject to the regulations is Envestra, which has a 
dividend yield of 0.097, and a ratio of imputation credits to cash dividends of zero (data 
from Bloomberg).  Thus, using the additional market parameter estimates discussed 
above, of T = 0.23, dm = 0.03 and ICm/Dm = 0.33, the resulting value of D for the 
company is0.014.  That is, in this case, the Officer CAPM underestimates the cost of 
equity capital by 1.4 percentage points.  If T = 0.33, this rises to two percentage points.  
The revenue implications of this underestimation would be very substantial for the 
                                         
12 With an average leverage level for Australian companies of 19% (Ernst and Young, 2000), the cost of 
equity is the dominant component in the weighted average cost of capital for the average Australian 
company. 
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company.  Furthermore, this is not a pathological case as high dividend yields are 
common amongst utility companies. 
 
One response to the analysis presented above might be to argue that the true value of T 
is highly uncertain and that the bounds on the value of D are modest.  Consequently a 
departure from the Officer model in favour of the model presented here is not justified.  
However, the Officer CAPM essentially represents a first step modification to the 
standard version of the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966), in that it 
incorporates dividend imputation but not differential taxation of capital gains and 
ordinary income.  Defining asset j’s r urn in the stand rd way as13 
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then the standard version of the CAPM states that 
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The Officer CAPM in equation (1) can be expressed as 
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13 Because returns are defined in this way the beta in the standard CAPM will be defined against such 
returns, and therefore might seem to differ from the beta in the Officer CAPM.  However the Officer model 
(as with the model presented in this paper) arises by assuming, inter alia, that dividends are non-s ochastic.  
Consequently the betas will be the same. 
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Comparison of (10) with (9) shows that the Officer CAPM specification of E(Rj) d ffers 
from that of the standard version of the CAPM by the addition of qj.  Similarly, the 
CAPM derived in this paper, at (7) above, can be restated as 
 
[ ] jjjFmFj RRERRE D++-+= qb)()(  
 
Thus, the standard version of the CAPM mis-esti ates E(Rj) by the amount (qj + Dj), 
and the Officer model is a first step in correcting this through the addition of qj. 
 
Table 1 shows the values of qj and (qj + Dj).  Two significant conclusions are apparent 
from a comparison of Dj, qj, and (qj + Dj), using the values for U and T of 1 and 0.23 
respectively.  First, across the eight cases considered in the rows of Table 1, the average 
absolute values for qj and Dj are comparable, at 1.7% and 1.4% respectively.14 Thus, 
looked at in isolation, the Officer adjustment to the standard CAPM (qj) and the 
adjustment to the Officer model proposed in this paper (Dj) are of comparable 
importance.  Second, across the eight cases considered in Tabl  1, the average absolute 
error in the Officer model (Dj) is much the same as that in the standard CAPM (qj + Dj).  
This is because Dj is typically opposite in sign to qj.15 Consequently, as often as not, 
application of the Officer CAPM either adjusts the standard CAPM in the wrong 
direction (relative to the appropriate adjustment of qj + Dj) or adjusts in the appropriate 
direction by over twice the appropriate level.  Thus, as often as not, the Officer CAPM 
produces a cost of equity f r her from the appropriate value than that produced by the 
standard CAPM.  A dramatic example appears in the last row of Table 1: the standard 
model overstates the cost of equity by only 0.7 percentage points (qj + Dj) whereas the 
Officer model understates it by 2.8 percentage points (Dj). 
 
These points imply that, if dividend imputation is to be recognised, it is at least as 
important to additionally recognise differential personal taxation of capital gains and 
ordinary income.  Such a CAPM could take the form derived in this paper (reflecting the 
                                         
14 If U = 0.6, the figures become 1% and 1.3% respectively. 
15 Examination of the formulas for Dj and qj in equations (8) and (11) respectively provides the explanation.  
The term Dj is a positive function of dj and ICj/Dj, and a negative function of dm and ICm/Dm.  For qj the 
reverse holds. 
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company tax view of imputation) or, alternatively, a model reflecting the investor tax 
view of imputation. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have shown that, with differential taxation of capital gains and ordinary 
income, the Officer CAPM may significantly misestimate the cost of equity capital.  
Relative to a model that additionally allows for this differential taxation, the degree of 
the approximation from use of the Officer CAPM is on average zero and sensitivity 
analysis shows that in many circumstances the degree of approximation is quite small.  
However, where the dividend yield is very high, the cost of equity could be 
underestimated by around four percentage points. 
 
The principal consequences of this are twofold.  First, some projects will be improperly 
accepted or rejected.  Second, for companies whose output prices are set on the basis of 
cost of capital, such as utility companies, underestimation of the cost of equity capital 
could have significant revenue implications.  Accordingly it would seem to be 
appropriate to switch to the use of a CAPM version that recognises both dividend 
imputation and differential taxation of capital gains and ordinary income.  Such a CAPM 
could take the form derived in this paper (reflecting the ompany tax view of 
imputation) or, alternatively, a model reflecting the investor tax view of imputation. 
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 TABLE 1 
The Degree of Approximation in the Officer Model
_______________________________________________________________________ 
dj    ICj/Dj     bj                                       Dj                                      qj            Dj + qj 
                                  _____________________________     _____________ 
                                  T = .13    T = .23    T = .23    T = .33     T = .23   T = .23       T = .23 
                                  U = 1       U = 1      U = .6      U = 1       U = 1     U = .6        U = 1 
 
0 0 0.5 -.007 -.012 -.012 -.017 .005 .003 -.007 
0 0 1.5 -.004 -.006 -.005 -.009 .015 .009 .009 
0 0.5 0.5 -.007 -.012 -.012 -.017 .005 .003 -.007 
0 0.5 0.5 -.003 -.005 -.005 -.007 .015 .009 .010 
0.1 0 0.5 .006 .011 .011 .016 .005 .003 .016 
0.1 0 1.5 .009 .017 .018 .024 .015 .009 .032 
0.1 0.5 0.5 .013 .022 .018 .032 -.045 -.027 -.023 
0.1 0.5 1.5 .016 .028 .025 .041 -.035 -.021 -.007 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
This table show values for Dj, qj and their sum for various combinations of the firm 
specific parameters dj, ICj/Dj and bj, and the market-wide parameters T and U.  All 
calculations assume RF = .065, dm = .03 and ICm/Dm = .33. 
 
 
